MACF represented the FMF in the first no-poach agreement case in Mexico.

 Professional related: Carlos Orcí , Francisco Fuentes Ostos   |      March 8th, 2022

Mijares, Angoitia, Cortés y Fuentes, S.C. (“MACF”) represented the Federación Mexicana de Fútbol Asociación, AC (the “FMF”) and several soccer clubs in the investigation and proceeding instituted by the Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica) (“COFECE”) in the market for the signing of professional soccer players, dealing with no-poach agreements between competitors.

In June 2018, COFECE initiated an ex officio investigation (the “Investigation”) in the aforementioned market, intended to investigate the practice known in the media as the “Gentleman’s Agreement (Pacto de Caballeros)” which consists of an agreement between the Liga MX clubs that, in the view of COFECE, may have restricted the mobility of professional players without a contract. This type of practice is commonly known as a no-poach agreement and constitutes an absolute monopolistic practice in terms of the Federal Economic Competition Law (the “Law”).

In September 2021, the COFECE issued a decision in which it determined that 17 Liga MX clubs were liable for carrying out the monopolistic practice, with the FMF and some individuals taking part as co-participants in the practice and imposed a total fine of MXP$177.6 million. After the decision, the FMF and the sanctioned Clubs paid the fines imposed, in order to terminate the proceeding, without challenging the decision.

The investigation is the first case initiated by COFECE in labor markets and is a clear example of the importance that these markets are gaining in the competition policies of antitrust authorities at an international level. For several years, competition authorities have expressed their interest in investigating to ensure that labor markets operate under competitive conditions, and that employers (in their role as contractors of labor services) do not engage in conduct that implies coordination: (i) to fix labor benefits (e.g. wages and salaries or some benefit granted as a labor incentive); and/or (ii) to restrict workers' mobility (with the consequent depression of wages and salaries).

By virtue of the foregoing, the investigation sets a precedent showing the importance of competition law in the labor field, and sends a message to companies that the Law is also applicable in the labor field and therefore, of the importance of training their respective human resources areas.

For more information regarding possible risks in no poach agreements, please consult our expert team.

Download PDF

Professional Related